Learn, hack!

URL

http://ftp.ccc.de/congress/28C3/mp4-h264-HQ/28c3-4800-en-how_governments_have_tried_to_block_tor_h264.mp4

File name

28c3-4800-en-how_governments_have_tried_to_block_tor_h264.mp4

File size

601.6 MB

MD5

97ac84591d8a2d4aa37c2583980a243d

SHA1

ca3e16ff758d2f37f2850059931e448d4a017576

Iran blocked Tor handshakes using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) in January 2011 and September 2011. Bluecoat tested out a Tor handshake filter in Syria in June 2011. China has been harvesting and blocking IP addresses for both public Tor relays and private Tor bridges for years. Roger Dingledine and Jacob Appelbaum will talk about how exactly these governments are doing the blocking, both in terms of what signatures they filter in Tor (and how we've gotten around the blocking in each case), and what technologies they use to deploy the filters -- including the use of Western technology to operate the surveillance and censorship infrastructure in Tunisia (Smartfilter), Syria (Bluecoat), and other countries. We'll cover what we've learned about the mindset of the censor operators (who in many cases don't want to block Tor because they use it!), and how we can measure and track the wide-scale censorship in these countries. Last, we'll explain Tor's development plans to get ahead of the address harvesting and handshake DPI arms races.