http://secdocs.lonerunners.net Latest security documents RSS feed for author Eric Filiol en-us <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/1613-seun-omosowon">Seun Omosowon</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/127-tor">Tor</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/103-chaos-communication-congress-28th-28c3-2011">Chaos Communication Congress 28th (28C3) 2011</a> <br/><b>Abstract</b>: This talk deals with weaknesses identified in the TOR network protocol and cryptography implementation. We manage to take control over users using this network and to access all your information and data exchanged despite cryptography. The TOR network is one of the most famous way to use Internet in a anonymous and secure way at least supposedly. Tor client software routes Internet traffic through a worldwide volunteer network of servers in order to conceal a user's location or usage from someone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. Aside protocol-oriented aspects, TOR security relies heavily on cryptography. The aim of this talk is to explain how it is possible to take over a significant part of the TOR network not to say over the whole network. We have identified two classes of weaknesses in the way Onion routers (Ors) are managed: a first class of weaknesses relates to the way the routes among Ors. It is possible to influence and to force users to use arbitrary Ors and hence control which route they take. A second class of weaknesses relates to the way cryptography is implemented. Bu using malware-based attacks and the concept of dynamic cryptographic backdoors we have succeeded to circumvent the cryptography in place without removing it. We present different possible attack scenarii which are malware-based or not (depending on the scenario considered) that have been experimented and validated on a TOR simulation network of 50 nodes and partially on the real TOR network (as far as it was possible regarding existing laws). We show that it is indeed possible to gain a lot of sensitive information thus bypassing and managing existing cryptographic mechanisms in a very efficient way and to take the effective control over a significant part of the TOR network. The attack is fully dynamic and can be replayed on request. We present an open source library that enable to automate the identification of hidden relay bridges. We propose some modification in the TOR source and protocol in order to prevent those attacks. Demos will be presented to expose the two class of vulnerabilities we exploit. An Internet access is required to make part of the demos on the real TOR network. Sat, 24 Mar 2012 06:44:39 +0100 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/5084-taking-control-over-the-tor-network http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/5084-taking-control-over-the-tor-network <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/1613-seun-omosowon">Seun Omosowon</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/127-tor">Tor</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/103-chaos-communication-congress-28th-28c3-2011">Chaos Communication Congress 28th (28C3) 2011</a> <br/><b>Abstract</b>: This talk deals with weaknesses identified in the TOR network protocol and cryptography implementation. We manage to take control over users using this network and to access all your information and data exchanged despite cryptography. The TOR network is one of the most famous way to use Internet in a anonymous and secure way at least supposedly. Tor client software routes Internet traffic through a worldwide volunteer network of servers in order to conceal a user's location or usage from someone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. Aside protocol-oriented aspects, TOR security relies heavily on cryptography. The aim of this talk is to explain how it is possible to take over a significant part of the TOR network not to say over the whole network. We have identified two classes of weaknesses in the way Onion routers (Ors) are managed: a first class of weaknesses relates to the way the routes among Ors. It is possible to influence and to force users to use arbitrary Ors and hence control which route they take. A second class of weaknesses relates to the way cryptography is implemented. Bu using malware-based attacks and the concept of dynamic cryptographic backdoors we have succeeded to circumvent the cryptography in place without removing it. We present different possible attack scenarii which are malware-based or not (depending on the scenario considered) that have been experimented and validated on a TOR simulation network of 50 nodes and partially on the real TOR network (as far as it was possible regarding existing laws). We show that it is indeed possible to gain a lot of sensitive information thus bypassing and managing existing cryptographic mechanisms in a very efficient way and to take the effective control over a significant part of the TOR network. The attack is fully dynamic and can be replayed on request. We present an open source library that enable to automate the identification of hidden relay bridges. We propose some modification in the TOR source and protocol in order to prevent those attacks. Demos will be presented to expose the two class of vulnerabilities we exploit. An Internet access is required to make part of the demos on the real TOR network. Fri, 23 Mar 2012 06:49:10 +0100 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/5082-taking-control-over-the-tor-network http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/5082-taking-control-over-the-tor-network <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/1613-seun-omosowon">Seun Omosowon</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/127-tor">Tor</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/103-chaos-communication-congress-28th-28c3-2011">Chaos Communication Congress 28th (28C3) 2011</a> <br/><b>Abstract</b>: This talk deals with weaknesses identified in the TOR network protocol and cryptography implementation. We manage to take control over users using this network and to access all your information and data exchanged despite cryptography. The TOR network is one of the most famous way to use Internet in a anonymous and secure way at least supposedly. Tor client software routes Internet traffic through a worldwide volunteer network of servers in order to conceal a user's location or usage from someone conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. Aside protocol-oriented aspects, TOR security relies heavily on cryptography. The aim of this talk is to explain how it is possible to take over a significant part of the TOR network not to say over the whole network. We have identified two classes of weaknesses in the way Onion routers (Ors) are managed: a first class of weaknesses relates to the way the routes among Ors. It is possible to influence and to force users to use arbitrary Ors and hence control which route they take. A second class of weaknesses relates to the way cryptography is implemented. Bu using malware-based attacks and the concept of dynamic cryptographic backdoors we have succeeded to circumvent the cryptography in place without removing it. We present different possible attack scenarii which are malware-based or not (depending on the scenario considered) that have been experimented and validated on a TOR simulation network of 50 nodes and partially on the real TOR network (as far as it was possible regarding existing laws). We show that it is indeed possible to gain a lot of sensitive information thus bypassing and managing existing cryptographic mechanisms in a very efficient way and to take the effective control over a significant part of the TOR network. The attack is fully dynamic and can be replayed on request. We present an open source library that enable to automate the identification of hidden relay bridges. We propose some modification in the TOR source and protocol in order to prevent those attacks. Demos will be presented to expose the two class of vulnerabilities we exploit. An Internet access is required to make part of the demos on the real TOR network. Fri, 23 Mar 2012 06:49:10 +0100 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/5083-taking-control-over-the-tor-network http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/5083-taking-control-over-the-tor-network <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/46-malware">malware</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/254-pdf">PDF</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/99-black-hat-eu-2008">Black Hat EU 2008</a> <br/> Fri, 27 Jan 2012 06:49:56 +0100 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/4815-new-viral-threats-of-pdf-language http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/4815-new-viral-threats-of-pdf-language <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/46-malware">malware</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/254-pdf">PDF</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/99-black-hat-eu-2008">Black Hat EU 2008</a> <br/> Fri, 27 Jan 2012 06:49:56 +0100 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/4816-new-viral-threats-of-pdf-language http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/4816-new-viral-threats-of-pdf-language <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/24-network">network</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/154-sniffer">sniffer</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/42-black-hat-usa-2008">Black Hat USA 2008</a> <br/> Sun, 04 Jul 2010 06:05:14 +0200 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/2633-passive-and-active-leakage-of-secret-data-from-non-networked-computer http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/2633-passive-and-active-leakage-of-secret-data-from-non-networked-computer <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/63-cryptography">cryptography</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/41-black-hat-eu-2010">Black Hat EU 2010</a> <br/><b>Abstract</b>: Despite the evergrowing use of block ciphers, stream ciphers are still widely used: satellite communications (military, diplomatic...), civilian telecommunications, software... If their intrinsic security can be considered as strong, the main drwaback lies in the high risk of key misuse wich introduces severe weaknesses, even for unconditionnally secure ciphers like the Vernam system. Such misuses are still very frequent, more than we could expect. In this talk we explain how to detect such misuses, to identify ciphertexts that are relevant to this misuse (among a huge amount of ciphertexts) and finally how to recover the underlying plaintext within minutes. This may also apply to (intendly or not) badly implemented block ciphers. To illustrate this technique, this talk will also deal with the technical cryptanalysis of encryption used in Office up to the 2003 version (RC4 based). We will focus on Word and Excel applications. The cryptanalysis has been successfully and we manage to recover more than 90% of the encrypted texts in a few seconds. The attack is based both on a pure mathematical effort AND a few basic forensic approach. In a more general cases (e.g. satellite communications), we just need to intercept ciphertexts. In the Office case, we will explain in our sense that the attack does not rely on particular weakness but in a setting that can be seriously considered and described as a possible intended trap. We will develop this concept to explain how in a more general way such trap can be built. Fri, 18 Jun 2010 06:05:06 +0200 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/2552-how-to-operationally-detect-and-break-misuse-of-weak-stream-ciphers-and-even-block-ciphers-sometimes---application-to-the-office-encryption-cryptanalysis http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/2552-how-to-operationally-detect-and-break-misuse-of-weak-stream-ciphers-and-even-block-ciphers-sometimes---application-to-the-office-encryption-cryptanalysis <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/63-cryptography">cryptography</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/41-black-hat-eu-2010">Black Hat EU 2010</a> <br/><b>Abstract</b>: Despite the evergrowing use of block ciphers, stream ciphers are still widely used: satellite communications (military, diplomatic...), civilian telecommunications, software... If their intrinsic security can be considered as strong, the main drwaback lies in the high risk of key misuse wich introduces severe weaknesses, even for unconditionnally secure ciphers like the Vernam system. Such misuses are still very frequent, more than we could expect. In this talk we explain how to detect such misuses, to identify ciphertexts that are relevant to this misuse (among a huge amount of ciphertexts) and finally how to recover the underlying plaintext within minutes. This may also apply to (intendly or not) badly implemented block ciphers. To illustrate this technique, this talk will also deal with the technical cryptanalysis of encryption used in Office up to the 2003 version (RC4 based). We will focus on Word and Excel applications. The cryptanalysis has been successfully and we manage to recover more than 90% of the encrypted texts in a few seconds. The attack is based both on a pure mathematical effort AND a few basic forensic approach. In a more general cases (e.g. satellite communications), we just need to intercept ciphertexts. In the Office case, we will explain in our sense that the attack does not rely on particular weakness but in a setting that can be seriously considered and described as a possible intended trap. We will develop this concept to explain how in a more general way such trap can be built. Fri, 18 Jun 2010 06:05:05 +0200 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/2551-how-to-operationally-detect-and-break-misuse-of-weak-stream-ciphers-and-even-block-ciphers-sometimes---application-to-the-office-encryption-cryptanalysis http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/2551-how-to-operationally-detect-and-break-misuse-of-weak-stream-ciphers-and-even-block-ciphers-sometimes---application-to-the-office-encryption-cryptanalysis <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/51-vulnerability">vulnerability</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/283-office">Office</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/24-black-hat-eu-2009">Black Hat EU 2009</a> <br/> Thu, 07 May 2009 22:27:00 +0200 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/829-openoffice-security-design-weaknesses http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/829-openoffice-security-design-weaknesses <b>Authors</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/authors/details/298-eric-filiol">Eric Filiol</a> <br/><b>Tags</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/51-vulnerability">vulnerability</a> <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/tags/details/283-office">Office</a> <br/><b>Event</b>: <a href="http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/events/details/24-black-hat-eu-2009">Black Hat EU 2009</a> <br/> Thu, 07 May 2009 22:10:00 +0200 http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/828-openoffice-security-design-weaknesses http://secdocs.lonerunners.net/documents/details/828-openoffice-security-design-weaknesses